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{A Second Opinion}
In the December, 1981, issue of
Ethics & Animals, Peter Wenz provided
a clear,
concise outline of Tom
Regan's "The Nature and Possibility of
an Envi ronmental Ethic." Wenz concluded that "this helpful article clarifies the issues with which it deals and
prepares the ground for further work
in the area." I would disagree with
that evaluation; I think Regan's conception of environmental ethics is
unpromising and his defense of that
conception is insignificant.
Regan's conception of environmental
ethics seems to be guided by the
desire for a firm foundation from
which one may morally condemn not
only individuals but also cultures and
humanity in general when they do not
care about preserving natural objects,
including plants, rivers, and other
nonconscious things.
He recognizes
that arguing for the preservation of
nature on utilitarian grounds,on the
grounds that natu ral objects express
important cultural values, or on other
homocentric, sentient-centric, or con. sCious-centric grounds will not provide him the fou ndation he wants.
This is because cultural values may
change and preserving natural objects
may not always. be what is best for
people, sentient bei ngs, or conscious
beings.
He seems to have concluded--rightly, I think--that the only
way of securing the unvarying moral
foundation for preservation which he
wants would be to establish that natural objects have a morally significant
good of their own; a good inherent in
them, a good independent of their
effects on or value for conscious, sentient, or human beings.
Regan does not attempt such an
argument in this essay, nor in the
others of his writings to which he
here refers.
Rather, he limits his
case to showing that the proposition
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that (some) nonconscious objects are
inherently good (i) is not incoherent
and (ii) must be true if the development of environmental ethics is to be
possible.
I shall first consider his
argument for the second of these conclusions, then. devote the. remainder of
this review to arguments concerning
the first conclusion.
The basic problem with Regan's
attempt to demonstrate that (some)
nonconscious, natural objects must be
inher'ently good if the development of
environmental ethics is to be possible
is that it begs the question. Regan's
argument here consists of considering
four other possible bases for environmental ethics, showing that they cannot "reasonably account for our duties
regarding the environment" (30), and
concluding that in the absence of any
other viable alternative, environmental
ethics must be based on accepting
that (some) nonconscious objects are
inherently good.
Among these four.
alternatives is a utilitarian environ-'
mental ethics, which would preserve
the natu ral environment because doing·
so is important for the well-being of
sentient beings, and an embodiment of
cultural values environmental ethics,
which would preserve nature because
it expresses or symbolizes important
cultu ral values, e. g., freedom, integrity, and power.
Regan finds these
two alternatives inadequate because
they would not commit us to preserving
nature
(Le.,
unmanufactured
environments (26)) in situations where
doing so would not benefit sentient
beings or where the environment did
not symbolize the cu rrent cultu ral
values of those intending to destroy
that environment.
However, these
limitations on the commitment to preserving
nature do not constitute
objections to utilitarian or embodiment
environmental ethics unless one presumes that among our duties regarding the environment are duties to preserve nature in situations where doing
so has no benefit, either utilitarian or
expressive, for the sentient beings
who will be affected by the preservation of that environment.
It is not
obvious that we ha've such duties, and
Regan does not even attempt to estab-
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lish that we have such duties.
So,
we would seem here to have a controversial, crucial unjustified presumptionin Regan's argument.
Another weakness in Regan's argument against a utilitarian environmental ethics can be found in· his claim
(27) that a utilitarian environmental
ethics would be susceptible to the following reductio: if we were capable of
manufacturing an environment which
would be significantly· more beneficial
for sentient beings (including future
generations and incorporating principles of fair distribution of this
increase in the general welfare) and if
it were the case that there was no
more beneficial (for sentient beings)
way for us to employ ou r energies
and resources, then we ought, on
utilitarian grounds, to replace the
natural environment with this manufactured environment.
(Regan's brief
statement of this reductio does not
elaborate all the above conditions, but
not to accept them would be to misrepresent utilitarianism and to refute·
a strawman.) Is this utilitarian conclusion absurd? Is it even wrong? Is
it detrimental to developing a coherent, effective environmental ethics,
given our current limited capacity for
manufacturing beneficial environments?
Some argument is needed to show that
the answer. to any of these questions
is "yes."
Regan provides no such
argument.
.
Rather, he moves on to claim that
"in the world as it actually is, there
are grounds for thinking that environmental protection efforts favor the
interests of a powerful elite rather
than maximizing the pleasure of all"
(27). This is supposed to show that
even under current conditions, utilitarianism
cannot
justify
preserving
nature.
However, these grounds are
nothing
but
rhetorical
flou rish.
First, the fact that "rising property
values in protected areas drive the
poor out" does not. even suggest that
the most effective way to maximize the
general welfare, or even the welfare
of the poor, would be to replace natural environments with "parking lots,
condominiums, and plastic trees" (27).
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Second, any viable utilitarian ethics
will include provisions for minority
opportunities (even for the elitel) and
fai r distribution of benefits. There is
no reason to believe that the general
welfare will be maximized by forcing
all of us to live the way only most of
us want to.
So utilitarianism would
not undermine attempts to preserve
some natu ral envi ronments, even if
the majority did prefer manufactured
environments.
Finally, utilitarianism
requires considering the pleasures of
animals, as well as of humans, and
indi rect contributions to pleasu re,
such as providing oxygen, enriching
the soil, and making other vital contributions to the biosphere.
"Plastic
trees" hold no promise of fulfilling
these needs. (Also, I see no reason
why a utilitarian environmental ethics
could
not
recognize the
benefits
obtained
th rough
having
natu ral
expressions of cultural (and trans-cultural) values, thereby embracing the
embodiment environmental ethics and
dispelling the impression that a utilitarian environmental ethics must regard
nature in a crudely instrumental
way.)
Consequently,
the cu rrent
prospects for the happiness of sentient beings do not support Regan's
claim that a utilitarian environmental
ethics could not justify current preservation efforts ..
It is trivially true that no principle
for determining ou r duties regarding
the environment which bases that
determination on something other than
the inherent goodness of the environment will be able to show that we
have duties regarding the envi ronment
independent of the well-being of other
beings or things than the environment.
That is, it is trivially true
that any such principle will be unable
to support Regan's conception of environmental ethics and the duties which
would follow from such an ethics.
But since Regan does
not even
attempt to demonstrate that his conception of envi ronmental ethics correctly expresses the sorts of duties
we have regarding the environment,
his conclusion here should be limited
to saying
that
utilitarianism
and
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embodiment of cultural values do not
provide adequate bases for the kind
of envi ronmental ethics he wants.
Before he can move on toconcludin-g
that what he wants does, and the
other theories do not "reasonably
account for our duties regarding the
environment," he will have to provide
some credible arguments in favor not
just of the logical possibility of his
theory but also of its adequacy and
accuracy. As it stands, he has given
us no reason to believe that we must
postulate the inherent goodness of
nonconscious objects in
order to
account for our duties regarding the
env ironment.
Tu rning to Regan's other point,
that it is logically possible for nonconscious objects to be inherently
good, his arguments for this proposition are limited to showing that some
arguments against this
proposition
contain premises, interpretations, or
presumptions which are not "self-evident and stand in need of rational
defense, something not provided by
the argument itself" (23).
There is a certain amount of merely
rhetorical flourish to such an objection, since no argument justifies its
own
definitions,
presumptions,
or
premises.
Still, Regan's defense of
his proposition is probably invincible.
If a conception of goodness as a simple, non-natural property, a la G. E.
Moore, is not logically Cncoherent,
then it will be impossible to prove
that nonconscious objects cannot possibly be inherently good. As Moore's
famous critique of naturalism amply
demonstrated, a simple, non-natural
property could (logically) be associated with anything.
Regan does not
openly subscribe to Moore's interpt'etation of goodness--although it is hard
to imagine any other interpreta'tion
which could accommodate the claims he
makes for his logically possible I know
not what--but the logical possibility of
such an interpretation, in conjunction
with Regan's never explaining what
makes something good, does explain
why he can so easily refute attempts
to prove that nonconscious objects
cannot (logically) be inherently good.
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It also explain why this defense of
his position is so insignificant: intuitionism has long since proven a dead
end, and what is needed to show
there may be "something worth thinking about" (19) in Regan's conception
of environmental ethics is not the
merely logical possibility of resu rrecting intuitionism but the substantive
possibility of developing a conception
of inherent goodness which will be
able to make an advance over interpretations of goodness based on happiness or interests (the two options
Regan criticizes).
We need to be
shown how Regan's conception of
inherent goodness can help us understand cases· or aspects of goodness
which these other interpretations cannot account for.
In a previous article, "Feinberg on
What Sorts of Beings Can
Have
Rights" (The Southern Jou rnal of Phi.Iosopl!y 1474 (1976)), to which h e
here refers
several times,
Regan
argued (i) that something, e.g., a
gardenia bush, can be good of its
kind without reference to its relation
to any conscious being and (ii) that
since something, e.g., a car, can be
good but not valued, there is a distinction between being valued, which
is what requires consciousness, and
being good, which is something the
object is in its own right.
Regan has
come to reject the concept of being
good of its kind as a basis for environmental ethics because such goodness need not be morally significant,
i.e., ·need not call for respect (33).
However, he does still consider it an
objective
good
that
nonconscious
things· may have independent of conscious bei ngs .
But is even this
reduced claim correct?
.

A plant's being good of its kind
clearly does not depend on anyone's
direct interest in the plant: weeds are
often healthy, flourishing paradigms
of thei r species. However, this does
not show that plants are good independent of conscious beings, for one
obvious explanation of how even weeds
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can be good of thei r kind is that they
express
the
values
of
conscious
beings, e.g., health, tenacity, fulfilling one's potential, and survival.
Regan acknowledges that the inherent
goodness of nonconscious objects is a
supervenient property (31), and if we
interpret
their
non-instrumental,
non-aesthetic goodness as the expressive or symbolic value their other
properties have (or can have or normally have or would have if observed)
for conscious beings, then we can
readily understand how this supervenientproperty arises. Especially the
non-instrumental, non-aesthetic goodness of rivers, cliffs, and other inorganic things seems to be intelligible
only in this way. I really cannot imagine how the undisturbed flowing of
the Colorado River would be good in a
world bereft of conscious beings--except as a possibility for the use. or
appreciation of conscious beings who
might someday return.
The water
would move differently, the cliffs be
formed
differently,
and
the mud
deposited differently if the river's
flow were impeded, but in· a world
bereft of (the possibility of) conscious
beings, how would one pattern of
movement, erosion, and sedimentation
be better than another? Finally, some
of the values expressed by natu ral
objects in being good of their kind
are moral values,
e. g., freedom,
which is why, as Regan emphasizes,
the appropriate response to these natural objects is respect.
So, the
expressive interpretation of· a nonconscious thing being good of its kind
can even recognize that some of these
things thereby acquire moral significance.

Of
cou rse,
offering
this
interpretation of the goodness of su rviving,
flourishing,
and otherwise
being good of one's kind does not
prove that it is logically impossible for
there to be another interpretation of
this goodness.
But it does explain
how this goodness is dependent on the
objective properties of the nonconscious object, is supervenient, is not
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of our direct desires concerning the
survival· or flourishing of the thing,
and in some cases has moral significance. It also shows that being good
of its kind is not a kind of goodness
that cannot be accounted for except
by postulating a goodness nonconscious objects can have independent of
.(the possibility of) conscious beings.
Turning to Regan's other point in
his contra- Feinberg essay, i. e., the
distinction
between
being
valued,
which requires consciousness, and
being good, which does not, this distinction can also be understood without postulating a kind of goodness
nonconscious objects can have independent of (the possibility of) conscious beings.
An
unvalued car
(Regan's example) can be good in the
same wayan unseen apple can be red.
"The unseen apple is red" can be
understood to mean that its physical
properties are such that if a being
relevantly like us were to see the
apple under normal lighting conditions, the color that being would see
is what we call "red." That is, the
objective redness of the apple is its
capacity to influence certain beings in
a certain way.
It has this capacity
whether or not it ever affects such a
being in this way.
Similarly, "the
unvalued car is good" may be understood to mean that its physical properties are such that if a being relevantly
Ii ke
us
wanted
reliable
transportation, knew how to use a
car, had the materials necessary for
using a car, and came across this
car, he would value it. This capacity
is something the car has whether or
not any being ever actually values the
car. So, the car can be good even
though never valued, and this is a
supervenient goodness of the car
itself.
But this goodness retains an
essential reference to the possible
desires, beliefs, understandings, and
other capabilities of conscious beings.
Given
these
obvious,
alternative
interpretations of being good of one's
kind and of being good though unvalued, Regan's arguments in his contra- Feinberg essay fail to give us any
reason to believe nonconscious objects
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have independent goodness.
Finally, in the present essay, as
well as in the contra- Feinberg essay,
Regan insists that "having an interest
in X" may mean either being interested in X or that X will contribute to
the individual's good, well-being, or
welfare (20). He concludes from this
that it is possible for nonconscious
objects to have interests and, consequently, a good of their own, since
only the first alternative, being interested in X, requires consciousness.
Regan is certainly correct in insist-·
ing that one can have an interest in
something in which he is not interested, e.g., his diet. But ordinarily
this is because that something will
affect what he does care about, e.g.,
his health, even though he does not
realize it.
Consider the following
example: suppose there is a cream I
do not know about which will cure
baldness, that I am bald, but that I
do not care (even subconsciously)
whether or not I am bald or about any
of the consequences of my baldness.
Cou Id it be said that nevertheless,
unbeknownst to me, I have an interest
in that cream?
That would be a
strange thing to say, and the only
way I can make any sense of such a
claim is in terms of people normally
wanting not to be bald and the possi~
bility that in spite of what I cu rrently
thin k and feel. I will be happier if I
get my hair back.
But such an
interpretation does not even suggest
that nonconscious objects can have
interests. Of cou rse, it is possible to
stipulate that "P has an interest in X"
may refer to situations in which P
does not or cannot care about what
will be produced by what he has an
interest in.
However, our common
understanding of "p has an interest in
X, even though he takes no interest
in X" strongly suggests that the
kinds of good, well-being, or welfare
to which things in which one has an
interest but takes no interest may
contribute are limited to feelings of
pleasure and pain, the fulfil\ment or
frustration of wants and desi res, and
other such conscious, sentient goods.
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It seems fair to say that Regan has
begged the question and been insensitive to the meaning of "having an
inter'est" by presuming that the kinds
of good, well-being, or welfare to
which the things in which one has an
interest may contribute do not themselves essentially involve a reference
to feelings, desir'es, and other things
only conscious beings
can
have,
Thus, having an interest in things in
which one takes no interest does not
indicate that interpretations of goodness which tie it to wants, desires,
cares, hopes, happiness, etc"
have
left something out, something which
requires postulating a goodness which
nonconscious objects can have independent of (the possibility of) conscious beings,
Like Regan's other essays, this one
is admirable for its clarity and organization.
However, although it clearly
indicates his personal dissatisfaction
with other theories of goodness and
envir'onmental ethics, this essay provides nothing in the way of a more
adequate theory of goodness or environmental ethics or even in the way of
arguments for convincing those who
do not share his unqualified commitment to preserving nature or his
dissatisfaction with other theories of
nature's goodness that they ought to
share his values. This essay merely
raises the logical possibility of an I
know not what and points in the
di rection
of
mysterious,
objective
value
properties,
conflicts
among
moral goods that are in principle incapable of r'ational adjudication (21),
and some form of intuitionism, Following such a path would seem to have
scant chance of helping us secure
serious
philosophical attention
for
environmental ethics, Regan will have
to find some positive arguments to
show those of us interested in securing serious philosophical attention for
envi ronmental ethics that. we cannot
avoid this thorny path or, at least,
that the path looks. promising before
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his concept of environmental ethics
can attain credibility and before we
need conclude that we should follow·
him on his adventure.
Steve F. Sapontzis
Californ ia State University,
Hayward

